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RULE 26.1 CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, amici the American
Hospital Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, Catholic Health
Association of the United States, Federation of American Hospitals, National
Association of Children’s Hospitals, and National Association of Public Hospitals
and Health Systems make the following disclosure statement:
Each of the above-named amici is a nonprofit association representing
America’s hospitals. None has a publicly owned parent corporation, subsidiary, or
affiliate, and none has issued shares or debt securities to the public. As a result no
publicly held company owns 10 percent or more of the stock of any of the abovenamed amici.

/s/ Catherine E. Stetson____________
Catherine E. Stetson
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IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
_______________
No. 10-2388
_______________
THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BARACK OBAMA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan
No. 10-11156 (Steeh, J.)
_______________
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION
ET AL. IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES
_______________
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The American Hospital Association, Association of American Medical
Colleges, Catholic Health Association of the United States, Federation of
American Hospitals, National Association of Children’s Hospitals, and National
Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems (the “Hospital Associations”)
respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.1

1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, amici certify that all parties
have consented to the filing of this brief. Amici likewise certify that no party’s
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel
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The American Hospital Association (“AHA”) represents nearly 5,000
hospitals, health care systems, and networks, plus 37,000 individual members.
AHA members are committed to improving the health of communities they serve
and to helping ensure that care is available to, and affordable for, all Americans.
The AHA educates its members on health care issues and advocates to ensure that
their perspectives are considered in formulating health care policy.
The Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) represents about
300 major non-federal teaching hospitals, all 133 allopathic medical schools, and
the clinical faculty and medical residents who provide care to patients there.
The Catholic Health Association of the United States (“CHA”) is the
national leadership organization for the Catholic health ministry. CHA’s more
than 2,000 members operate in all 50 states and offer a full continuum of care,
from primary care to assisted living. CHA works to advance the ministry’s
commitment to a just, compassionate health care system that protects life.
The Federation of American Hospitals (“FAH”) is the national
representative of investor-owned or managed community hospitals and health
systems. FAH has nearly 1,000 member hospitals in 46 states and the District of

contributed money intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission; and no
person other than amici and their members and counsel contributed money
intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission.
2
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Columbia. These members include rural and urban teaching and non-teaching
hospitals and provide a wide range of acute, post-acute, and ambulatory services.
The National Association of Children’s Hospitals (“N.A.C.H.”) is a trade
organization that supports its 141 hospital members in addressing public policy
issues. N.A.C.H.’s mission is to promote the health and well-being of children and
their families through support of children’s hospitals and health systems.
The National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems (“NAPH”)
is comprised of some 140 of the nation’s largest metropolitan safety net hospitals
and health systems, committed to providing health care to all without regard to
ability to pay. NAPH represents members’ interests in matters before Congress,
the Executive Branch, and the courts.
The six Hospital Associations represent virtually every hospital and health
system in the country—public and private; urban and rural; teaching and children’s
hospitals; investor-owned and non-profit. Their members will be deeply affected
by the outcome of this case. American hospitals are committed to the well-being
of their communities and offer substantial community-benefit services. As part of
that mission, they dedicate massive resources to caring for the uninsured. The
uninsured, after all, need health care like everyone else. Nearly every hospital with
an emergency department is required to provide emergency services to anyone,
regardless of ability to pay. And even when an uninsured patient arrives planning
3
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to pay his or her own way, that patient may struggle to pay for an extended stay.
The upshot: Hospitals treat tens of millions of uninsured individuals each year,
and most of that care is uncompensated. Indeed, in 2009 alone, hospitals provided
more than $39 billion in uncompensated care to the uninsured and under-insured.
American Hosp. Ass’n, Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet 4 (Dec.
2010) (“Fact Sheet”);2 see also J. Hadley et al., Covering The Uninsured In 2008:
Current Costs, Sources Of Payment, And Incremental Costs 403, Health Affairs
(Aug. 25, 2008) (“Covering The Uninsured”).3 And while hospitals do all they can
to assist patients, burdens on uninsured individuals remain heavy. Millions of
families are just one major illness from financial ruin.
That is why the Hospital Associations favored enactment of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). While the legislation is not perfect,
it would extend coverage to millions more Americans. To undo the ACA now
would be to maintain an unacceptable status quo—a result that is neither prudent
nor compelled by the Constitution.

2

Available at http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2010/pdf/
10uncompensatedcare.pdf.
4
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE CLAIM THAT UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS ARE “INACTIVE”
IS LEGALLY IRRELEVANT.
Plaintiffs’ individual-mandate argument is premised on the notion that, by

requiring many Americans to obtain health insurance, Congress is regulating
“inactivity.” Plaintiffs’ Br. (“Pl. Br.”) 13. Thus plaintiffs describe individuals
without health insurance as “doing absolutely nothing but ‘living’ and
‘breathing,’ ” id., and as engaging merely in the “mental choice” of declining to
purchase insurance. Id. This contention fails for at least three separate reasons.
Amici address the first two only briefly, as they are more fully set forth by the
Government. See Brief of the United States (“U.S. Br.”) 27-39, 45-52.
First, plaintiffs’ contention that “activity” is an independent requirement of
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause is mistaken. Though
plaintiffs strive mightily to suggest otherwise, the Supreme Court has never created
an “activity” requirement. On the contrary, the Court has used the term only as a
descriptor in discussing the broad outlines of Congress’s power, see United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (explaining that legal standards for the
Commerce Clause “are not precise formulations, and in the nature of things they
cannot be”), and has not used it in every instance when describing congressional

3

Available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/27/5/w399.
5
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power. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (Congress may regulate
“a practice” that poses “a threat to the national market”). Nor would it make sense
to require “activity” as a separate prong of the Commerce Clause analysis. The
relevant question under the Commerce Clause is not whether Congress is targeting
activity, but whether the object of congressional regulation is causing a substantial
“impact on commerce.” Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968).
Indeed, to superimpose an activity requirement “is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties,” Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-590
(1937), because whether a regulated individual is engaged in relevant activity
depends on one’s perspective: As we discuss infra at 18-19, almost any individual
subject to regulation can be described as “active” or “inactive,” depending on the
level of generality one adopts. The law does not turn on these sorts of malleable
distinctions. And when such distinctions have been created in the past, they have
quickly been abandoned as unworkable failures. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 120 (1942) (“[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by
reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such
as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ * * * .”).
Second, even if “activity” were required to justify a free-standing regulation,
and even if it were absent here—which it is not, as we discuss at length below—
that would be irrelevant. The individual mandate is not a free-standing regulation;
6
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it is, instead, an important component of the ACA’s comprehensive regulatory
reform of the interstate health care and health insurance markets. As such,
Congress has the authority to enact it. As the Supreme Court explained in Raich,
Congress is well within its Commerce Clause authority when it regulates
individuals—even individuals not participating in interstate commerce—as an
integral part of “a lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive
framework” governing a larger interstate market. 545 U.S. at 24; accord United
States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (Congress has the
authority to regulate where, as here, a failure “to do so would undermine
Congress’s ability to implement effectively the overlying economic regulatory
scheme.”). The ACA is “a lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive
framework” governing an interstate market if ever there was one. Raich, 545 U.S.
at 24. Because the individual mandate plays an integral role in facilitating
Congress’s regulation of that market, it is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority
under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
II.

THE CLAIM THAT UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS ARE “INACTIVE”
IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT.
For both of these reasons, plaintiffs’ challenge to the ACA fails. But amici

wish to focus in greater detail on a third, independent reason why this Court should
affirm: Even if the Commerce Clause limited Congress to the regulation of
7
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“activity,” the requirement would be met in this case because uninsured Americans
unquestionably participate in relevant economic activity—they obtain health care
services. Indeed, the uninsured engage in that activity in massive numbers and
with great frequency. The vast majority of uninsured individuals receive health
care services regularly, and the cost (to the patients themselves, those who treat
them, and taxpayers) is extraordinary. Thus an individual’s decision to purchase or
decline health insurance is nothing other than a decision about how he will pay, or
make others pay, for existing and future health care costs—i.e., how he will pay for
services he will receive. That is quintessential economic activity.
Plaintiffs can assert that the uninsured are “passive” and engaged in mere
“inactivity” only by focusing exclusively on the health insurance market and
ignoring the broader market Congress chose to regulate through the ACA—the
health care market. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A). The Court should reject this
invitation to redefine the lens through which Congress viewed the facts. Congress
was entitled to perceive its task as the regulation of the whole health care market,
and to recognize that health insurance serves as a financing mechanism in that
broader market. Under rational basis review, the Court must “respect the level of
generality at which Congress chose to act.” United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d
25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 22).

8
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A.

Because The Uninsured Are Virtually Certain To Accrue Health
Care Costs, The Decision To Purchase Or Decline Insurance Is
“Economic Activity.”

All Americans—insured and uninsured alike—make use of the health care
system, thus accruing health care costs. Given this reality, all individuals must
make a decision as to how to finance these costs. That decision is economic
activity, and the individual mandate regulates this marketplace behavior.
1.

Simply stated, uninsured Americans are engaged in economic activity

because they seek and obtain large amounts of health care, and someone must pay
the tab. In 2008 alone, the most recent year for which full statistics are available,
the uninsured received $86 billion worth of health care from all providers.
Covering The Uninsured 399, 402-403; see infra at 13-16. The uninsured also
made more than 20 million visits to hospital emergency rooms. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., New Data Say Uninsured Account for Nearly One-Fifth
of Emergency Room Visits (July 15, 2009).4 And without the individual mandate,
those numbers likely would continue to rise. The number of adults aged 18-64
who go without health insurance for some portion of the year has been increasing
steadily over the past few years. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital

4

Available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/07/20090715b.html.
9
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Signs: Access to Health Care (Nov. 9, 2010).5 Approximately 50 million people
fell into this category over the course of the past twelve months. Id.
The vast majority of these millions of uninsured individuals—at least 94
percent—seek and receive health care services at some point. J. E. O’Neill and
D.M. O’Neill, Who Are the Uninsured? An Analysis of America’s Uninsured
Population, Their Characteristics and Their Health 21 & Table 9 (2009) (“Who Are
The Uninsured”).6 For example, 68 percent of the uninsured population had a
routine check-up in the past five years, and 50 percent had one in the past two
years. Id. at 20. Sixty-five percent of uninsured women had a mammogram within
the last five years; 80 percent of uninsured women had a Pap smear in that time
frame; and 86 percent of uninsured individuals had a blood pressure check. Id. at
20-22 & Table 9. The takeaway is simple enough: “[T]he uninsured receive
significant amounts of healthcare[.]” Id. at 24. The uninsured thus are not
“inactive” in the health care market; they are frequent participants. And their
decision to forgo health insurance is an economic decision directly related to the
services they routinely receive. It is a decision about how to pay—or ask others to
pay—for services rendered.

5

Available at http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/HealthcareAccess/index.html.

6

Available at http://epionline.org/studies/oneill_06-2009.pdf.
10
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2.

Nor is there any doubt that the overwhelming majority of uninsured

individuals do—and must—participate in this market, even absent the individual
mandate. Nearly all people, sooner or later, receive health care whether they
would have chosen to or not. When a person has a medical crisis, or is in a car
accident, or falls and breaks a limb, he or she is transported to the hospital and
provided care. Most Americans thus cannot simply “exit” the health care market.
The choice they face, instead, is how to pay for the care they inevitably will
receive.7 By forgoing insurance, individuals simply shift the burden of their health
care payments to others. See infra at 13-17. The health care market is unique in
this respect. The combination of actions it requires of consumers—accepting
services and deciding how to pay for them—is economic activity, pure and simple,
and is subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
3.

Plaintiffs’ “passivity” argument also obscures an important reality:

Although the uninsured population seeks and receives significant amounts of
preventive care, the uninsured still receive far less preventative care than the
insured. Who Are The Uninsured at 20-22 & Table 9. The decision of some
uninsured individuals to put off regular preventive care actually increases their
7

That some small percentage of Americans never receives health care does not
change the constitutional calculus. Congress may consider and regulate the market
in the aggregate, and the courts will not “excise individual components of that
larger scheme.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; see also Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 192-193.
11
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activity in the health care market in the long run. That is because “[d]elaying or
forgoing needed care can lead to serious health problems, making the uninsured
more likely to be hospitalized for avoidable conditions.” Kaiser Comm’n on
Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Uninsured & the Difference Health Care Makes 2
(Sept. 2010).8 As the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention observed:
“Approximately 40 percent of persons in the United States have one or more
chronic disease[s], and continuity in the health care they receive is essential to
prevent complications, avoidable long-term expenditures, and premature
mortality.” J. Reichard, CDC: Americans Uninsured at Least Part of the Year on
the Rise, Harming Public Health, CQ Healthbeat News (Nov. 9, 2010) (emphasis
added). For example, “[s]kipping care for hypertension can lead to stroke and
costly rehabilitation” and “[s]kipping it for asthma can lead to hospitalization.” Id.
This is not mere rhetoric. Studies have shown that “[l]ength of stay” in the
hospital is “significantly longer” for uninsured patients who suffer from heart
attacks, stroke, and pneumonia than for insured patients with those conditions—a
disparity researchers attribute at least in part to “uninsured patients’ lack of access
to primary care and preventive services.” E. Bakhtiari, In-Hospital Mortality Rates

8

Available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-12.pdf.
12
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Higher for the Uninsured, HealthLeaders Media (June 14, 2010).9 For this reason,
too, it makes little sense to suggest that people can declare themselves out of the
health care market. Pl. Br. 14-15. Any decision to avoid that market in the short
term simply produces more market activity in the medium and long term.
Congress had the authority to recognize as much, and to regulate the uninsureds’
choice about who will pay for that market activity.10
B.

Care Provided To The Uninsured Costs Billions Per Year, And
Everyone In The Nation Helps To Pay The Bill.

Uninsured Americans, in short, regularly obtain health care services and
decide how (and whether) to pay for them—“activities” in the market by any
measure. And those services are costly. As mentioned above, the uninsured pay a
substantial portion of the bill themselves—a whopping $30 billion in 2008 alone.
Covering The Uninsured 399. But an even greater share is borne by hospitals,
health systems, doctors, insurers, and even other patients. Because the uninsured

9

Available at http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/QUA252419/InHospital-Mortality-Rates-Higher-for-the-Uninsured.html.
10

It is important to note that plaintiffs exaggerate the burden the individual
mandate purportedly imposes on the uninsured. Some 90 percent of those subject
to the mandate will receive free or subsidized care under ACA. Those under 133
percent of the Federal Poverty Level (“FPL”) will be fully covered by Medicaid.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). For those earning up to 400 percent of the
FPL, the federal government will subsidize a substantial portion of the premiums.
U.S. Br. 17.
13
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create an enormous cost for the market, the activity they engage in is “economic,”
and Congress may regulate it.
1.

To begin with the providers: Of the $86 billion in care the uninsured

received in 2008, about $56 billion was uncompensated care provided by hospitals,
doctors, clinics, and health-care systems.11 That $56 billion exceeds the gross
domestic product of some 70 percent of the world’s nations. Covering The
Uninsured 399, 403; see T. Serafin, Just How Much is $60 Billion?, Forbes
Magazine (June 27, 2006).12 All hospitals and health care providers, large and
small, shoulder these uncompensated-care costs. See National Ass’n of Pub. Hosp.
& Health Sys., What is a Safety Net Hospital? 1 (2008).13 But the costs fall
particularly heavily on “core safety-net” hospitals—the term for hospitals or health
systems that serve a substantial share of uninsured, Medicaid, and other vulnerable
patients. Institute of Med., America’s Health Care Safety Net: Intact But

11

This is derived by subtracting $30 billion in uninsured self-payment from the
$86 billion total. See supra at 9, 13. Of the $56 billion in uncompensated care,
some $35 billion is provided by hospitals, and the rest by doctors, clinics, and other
providers. Covering The Uninsured 402-403.
12

Available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/06/27/billion-donation-gatescz_ts_0627buffett.html.
13

Available at http://literacyworks.org/hls/hls_conf_materials/
WhatIsASafetyNetHospital.pdf.
14
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Endangered (2000).14 For these hospitals, uncompensated care amounts to some
21 percent of total costs. What is a Safety Net Hospital? 1.
To be sure, hospitals bear many of these expenses as part of their charitable
mission—but that does not change the fact that an uninsured individual’s decision
to seek care is, and triggers, economic activity. A description of how hospitals
work to serve uninsured patients illustrates the point. As noted above, nearly every
hospital with an emergency department is required to provide emergency services
to anyone, regardless of ability to pay. See Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act of 1986 (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. But even when the
patient’s need does not rise to the level of an emergency, hospitals provide free or
deeply discounted care. Most hospitals’ policies “specify that certain patients,”
such as “those who do not qualify for Medicare or other coverage and with
household incomes up to a specified percentage of the Federal Poverty Level or
‘FPL,’ ” will not be charged at all for the care they receive. Healthcare Fin. Mgmt.
Ass’n, A Report from the Patient Friendly Billing Project 8 (2005).15 Other

14

Available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2000/
Americas-Health-Care-Safety-Net/Insurance%20Safety%20Net%202000%20%
20report%20brief.pdf.
15

Available at http://www.hfma.org/HFMA-Initiatives/Patient-FriendlyBilling/PFB-2005-Uninsured-Report.
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patients, such as those “with incomes up to some higher specified percentage of the
FPL,” will “qualify for discounts on their hospital bills.” Id.
Most uninsured (and under-insured) patients with incomes that exceed these
levels, however, also face difficulty paying for services, especially if they require
an extended hospital stay. Despite their incomes, some may qualify for reducedprice care under hospital policies that assist the “medically indigent”—i.e.,
“patients whose incomes may be relatively high, but [whose] hospital bills exceed
a certain proportion of their annual household income or assets.” Id. at 11. For
others, hospitals offer financial counseling, flexible payment plans, interest-free
loans, and initiatives that help patients apply for grants or Medicaid. Id. at 11-15.
These services advance hospitals’ missions to serve the community—but they also
require substantial time and resources that add to the already massive costs
hospitals absorb to treat the uninsured.
2.

In the final analysis, hospitals and other health care providers provide

tens of billions of dollars worth of uncompensated care per year, including services
to the uninsured and under-insured. Fact Sheet 4. They do not shoulder the burden
alone, however. Supplemental Medicare and Medicaid payment programs also
fund care for the uninsured—in other words, American taxpayers share the cost.
Covering The Uninsured 403-404. State and local governments—taxpayers
again—likewise fund certain of these expenses. Id. at 405. Finally, insured
16
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patients (and their insurers) end up effectively paying some portion of the bills
generated by their uninsured counterparts: As hospitals and other providers absorb
costs of uncompensated care, they have fewer funds to reinvest and to cover their
ongoing expenses, and that in turn drives costs higher. Id. at 406. In short, the
vast cost of health care for the uninsured is, of necessity, borne by the rest of the
nation, and it affects prices in the health care and the health insurance markets. To
say the uninsured render themselves “inactive” by declining to purchase insurance
is to ignore reality. The uninsured still obtain health care; others just pay for it.
C.

Plaintiffs’ Attempt To Analogize This Case To Lopez Fails.

Plaintiffs resist such facts, arguing that it is a mere “inference” that
uninsured individuals use the healthcare system and shift billions in costs to third
parties. Pl. Br. 16. Plaintiffs are flat wrong. This case could not be further from
those, such as Lopez, where the Supreme Court has deemed the inferential chain
between the regulated event and the effect on commerce to be too attenuated.
In Lopez, the chain of inferences required to connect the regulated event
(gun ownership in a school zone) to a substantial effect on interstate commerce
was long and winding, not to mention unquantifiable. First, one had to assume that
firearm possession in a school zone leads to violent crime; second, that guns in
schools accordingly “threaten[ ] the learning environment”; third, that the
“handicapped educational process” supposedly produced by guns in school zones
17
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would “result in a less productive citizenry”; and finally, that this firearmhampered citizenry would dampen the national economy. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563564. Nearly every step in this chain was a matter of conjecture and hypothesis.
Here, by contrast, the connection between a lack of pre-financed health-care
purchases and interstate commerce is immediate and demonstrable: The uninsured
receive health care and many cannot pay for it out of pocket. As a result, tens of
billions of dollars a year in costs are absorbed by third parties, distorting the
market. Congress found as much, see 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F), and its findings
were not just rational—they were plainly correct. No “inference” is required.
D.

Plaintiffs’ Attempt To Characterize The Behavior Of The
Uninsured As “Inactivity” Misperceives The Court’s Task.

Plaintiffs nonetheless insist that the uninsured are inactive in the health
insurance market, that Congress is “forcing” them to participate, and that that
forced participation is unprecedented in American history. Pl. Br. 11-15. But
plaintiffs’ approach proves too much: Nearly any behavior that has been, or could
be, the object of legislative regulation could be characterized as “inactivity.” The
motel owners in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964),
for example, were “inactive” in the sense that they refused to do something—serve
black customers—and were forced to do it by federal law. The farmers in Wickard
were “inactive” in the sense that they refused to do something—participate in the
18

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850476 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 26

public wheat market—and were “forc[ed] * * * into the market to buy what they
could provide for themselves.” 317 U.S. at 129. And one can imagine a range of
other circumstances in which the regulated individual would be “inactive” and yet
Congress clearly could regulate. Take, for example, protesters who choose to sit
passively at the entrance to nuclear power plants, refusing to move and blocking
the way for crucial employees. Surely Congress would be entitled to forbid that
“inactivity” if it found that it substantially affected the interstate energy market.
Plaintiffs, no doubt, would respond that all of these examples involve some
underlying active component—for example, walking to the nuclear facility to start
the protest. But so too here. Uninsured individuals obtain health care services in a
massive national market. That is an active component, and one that has a very
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Plaintiffs’ argument thus merely
underscores the fact that whether a regulated individual is sufficiently “active” is a
matter of perspective. And that, in turn, dooms their case. After all, courts are not
in the business of overruling Congress when it comes to characterizing the relevant
facts. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (“We need not determine whether respondents’
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact,
but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”); Wirtz, 392 U.S. at
190 (“[W]here we find that the legislators * * * have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
19
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investigation is at an end.’ ”) (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303304 (1964)). Thus, “within wide limits, it is Congress—not the courts—that
decides how to define a class of activity.” Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42. Here
Congress found that the individual mandate “regulates activity that is commercial
and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when
health care is paid for[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A). Congress was entitled to
understand the market in that way, just as it was entitled to conclude that motel
owners were “active” when they refused service to black customers and that
Roscoe Filburn was “active” when he refused to buy wheat at retail. The only
question for this Court is whether Congress’s determination was rational. It was,
for all the reasons above.
E.

Plaintiffs’ Slippery-Slope Hypotheticals Are Inapposite.
Finally, plaintiffs turn to a tactic ACA opponents consistently have relied

upon: They insist that if Congress can require participants in the health care
market to buy insurance, then it can “regulate any and all behavior imaginable.”
Pl. Br. 13. According to plaintiffs, Congress’s assertion of authority in the ACA
means it could also “mandate that we all join a health club,” that we “take multivitamins daily,” that we “dine only in government-approved ‘health’ restaurants,”
that we “los[e] weight,” and that we “buy[ ] a GMC truck.” Pl. Br. 12, 31.
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Not so. There is a key difference between this case and the hypothetical
laws plaintiffs describe: In this case, the activity individuals are being “forced” to
undertake16 is a mere financing mechanism for another activity that they already
undertake: consumption of health care. Congress did not make people obtain that
underlying product in new or different quantities, and this case does not present the
question whether Congress could do so. Instead, Congress made sure people pay
for what they get. To put things in plaintiffs’ terms, Congress did not make anyone
buy a GMC truck. It instead made sure no one can drive a GMC truck off the lot
and tell the car dealership to bill their neighbor (or to absorb the cost itself).
Plaintiffs’ hypotheticals also fail for a second reason: They completely
ignore the fact that Congress may not assert a “substantial effect” on interstate
commerce via unlikely inferential chains. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-564. It is
hard to imagine how Congress might claim that the failure to “take multi-vitamins
daily,” Pl. Br. 12, for example, substantially affects commerce without engaging in
the same sort of inference-upon-inference logic that was disapproved in Lopez.
(The logic presumably would be something like: “People fail to take multivitamins; it can be assumed that those same people do not eat balanced diets;

16

Plaintiffs, of course, will not actually be forced to purchase health insurance
under the ACA. They will instead be assessed a penalty through the tax system if
they decline to purchase insurance. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1).
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failure to eat a balanced diet or take vitamins can lead to disease; disease raises
health-care costs.” Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563). For this reason, too, the fact
that Congress can regulate financing mechanisms in the nation’s largest economic
sector hardly means it can “regulate any and all behavior imaginable.” Pl. Br. 13.
Finally, plaintiffs’ alarmist hypotheticals are not just inapposite but
unrealistic because they ignore the limits the political process places on Congress’s
actions. The Supreme Court has recognized for two centuries that while the
Commerce Clause power is broad, Congress is restrained by the electorate. Put
another way, it has recognized that “effective restraints on [the] exercise” of the
Commerce power “must proceed from political, rather than from judicial,
processes.” Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(9 Wheat.), 197 (1824)). To suggest that Congress would force all Americans to
buy a GMC truck, or to buy a pound of broccoli every week,17 or to sleep at
particular times, 18 is to abandon faith in representative democracy.

17

See D. Kam, U.S. judge in Pensacola weighs Florida, 19 other states’ challenge
of health care law, Palm Beach Post News, Friday, Dec. 17, 2010.
18

See id.
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CONCLUSION
Hospitals will continue to care for the uninsured, as they have for
generations, regardless of their ability to pay—and indeed, for many hospitals that
service is at the core of their mission. But let there be no mistake: The choice to
forgo health insurance is not a “passive” choice without concrete consequences.
The health care uninsured Americans obtain has real costs. Their decision to
obtain care, and how to pay for it, is economic activity with massive economic
effects, including the imposition of billions in annual costs on the national
economy. In regulating the national health care industry, Congress possessed
ample authority to address those costs by changing the way uninsured Americans
finance the services they receive.
The District Court’s judgment should be affirmed.
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